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It is common knowledge that many arguments about basic legal and moral
questions go nowhere. One reason for this is that the parties to the dispute
often start from different basic assumptions yet they are either unaware or
only dimly aware that they are each proceeding from different starting
points. They thus end up arguing in an endlessly inconclusive manner about
the implications of their unexpressed basic assumptions rather than trying to
achieve some common agreement as to the basic initial assumptions that
will serve as the background of their attempt to resolve their dispute.
Without such initial agreement, reaching agreement on the matter that
prompted the dispute is often unobtainable. In this article I wish to illustrate
this thesis through the examination of certain legal and philosophical
disputes that have engaged the interest of contemporary lawyers and
philosophers.
The presuppositions we bring to any legal or philosophical dispute
are many and varied. At the most basic level we would need to take note of
how our conceptions of the content and form of ideal arguments affect legal
and moral reasoning. These are the sorts of arguments that one would
address to what Chaϊm Perelman,1 and Jϋrgen Habermas2 following
Perelman, called ‘the universal audience’, the audience to our discourse that
we presuppose when we discuss notions such as truth, justice, or the basic
values of human society. Some of these conceptions about the ideal form
and structure of argument might be said to be truly universal in the sense of
being widely shared among people of different beliefs and cultures, such as
that it is a necessary condition of legal and moral argument that no one
should consciously and deliberately put forward as true what he does not
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honestly believe to be true. These preconceptions or assumptions are so
widely shared that it makes little difference whether they are consciously
acknowledged by the participants in legal and moral disputes. Other
conceptions as to the ideal structure and form of argument, however, are not
so widely shared. The universal audience that they presuppose, whether
consciously or unconsciously, arises out of a particular culture or tradition.
For example, in the United States and at least traditionally at common law,
it would be inconceivable that the prosecution could appeal against a jury
verdict of acquittal no matter how perverse. In many European countries,
prosecutorial appeals against trial court acquittals are not only possible as a
matter of theory but occur in actual practice.3 This is now also possible in
Canada in some instances.4 It is furthermore possible in some European
countries for a person who has been acquitted to be retried in a new
proceeding in some circumstances5 and the British Government has
announced its intention to introduce legislation to permit such retrials in the
United Kingdom in some limited circumstances.6 Indeed, in a recent case
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See, eg, German Code of Criminal Procedure, St PO s 296.
R.S.C. c. C-46, s 676 (1985) (prosecutorial appeals allowed and subsequent
retrial of acquitted defendants permitted when errors of law are made, such
as misdirection of the jury).
See, eg, German Code of Criminal Procedure, St PO s 362 (allowing new
prosecutions despite prior acquittal in cases of false statements at original
trial as well as subsequent admissions of guilt by the acquitted person).
See ‘Home News’, The Times (London), Thursday, 18 July 2002 at 7. New
prosecutions are to be permitted when there is ‘compelling new evidence.’ It
is interesting to note that Article 20 of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, the double jeopardy (or ne bis idem) provision, does allow
subsequent prosecution before the International Criminal Court when the
prior proceedings were undertaken to shield the accused from criminal
prosecution for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court or were not
conducted impartially and were conducted in a manner ‘inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.’ I appreciate that, because of
the separate sovereignty problem, a person convicted or acquitted in one
jurisdiction can be prosecuted again in another for substantially the same
crime. This possibility is explicitly recognised in German law St. PO
s 153c(1)(3). Under this provision a German prosecutor has the discretion to
prosecute a person who has been previously tried in another country.
Moreover, in a federal nation-state, such as the United States, which, unlike
Germany or Canada, has separate state and federal systems of criminal law,
successive prosecutions can also occur, particularly with the continued
extension of federal criminal law to cover matters that at one time were
considered of concern only to the states. Congress, however, has made state
judgments of conviction or acquittal on the merits conclusive with regard to
a number of crimes. See United States Attorneys Manual § 9-2. 031. As to
all other crimes a successive federal prosecution must be based on a finding
of a substantial federal interest which the state prosecution left unvindicated
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the Privy Council expressly held that the values underlying the traditional
common-law privilege against self-incrimination that is enshrined as an
absolute in the American Constitution, although obviously important, need
to be balanced against the other values implicated in the prosecution of a
criminal accused.7
What accounts for such differences on such basic features of criminal
justice? Why should what seems entirely fair and reasonable in one legal
tradition seem completely unfair and unreasonable in another? Undoubtedly
historical tradition is part of the explanation but there is probably also an
underlying difference between the values encapsulated in the Bill of Rights
of the United States Constitution, admittedly an Eighteenth Century
constitution, and those reflected in the much more contemporary statements
of basic rights that have been adopted in the last few years in other
countries. The American Constitution and its Bill of Rights were addressed
to and presuppose an ideal or universal audience that accepts that the
purpose of such a constitution was, to quote a phrase often used by Justice
William O Douglas in several variants, ‘to get the government off the backs
of the people and keep it off.’8 And, in one of his opinions, he added that, in
this respect, the American constitutional scheme was ‘unlike more recent
models promoting a welfare state.’9 The universal or ideal audience to
which more recent declarations of basic rights, such as the European
Convention on Human Rights, are addressed is, in contrast, one that
believes that not only certain traditional rights of the criminal accused but
also even freedom of expression, while very important, are not so
paramount that they cannot be restricted by the state in the name of some
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other important democratic values.10 In other words, the resolution of what
seems to be a fairly limited question, such as whether a criminal should or
should not be retried because the trier of fact has made an egregiously
erroneous determination of fact or because of newly discovered evidence,
like the limits of freedom of expression, ultimately really turns on the
resolution of the more basic and often ignored question of the nature of the
relationship of the individual to the social collective. It is with regard to this
question that the real dispute lies.
This conflict between perspectives that give paramount weight to the
interests of the individual and perspectives that focus more on the interests
of the social collective is, of course an old one. It is the conflict between
two ways of conceiving the common good. Is it, to quote Michael
Oakeshott, ‘composed of the various goods that might be sought by
individuals on their own account … [or] an independent entity?’11 It is a
conflict, unfortunately all too often unexpressed, that plays itself out in
discussions as disparate as whether affirmative action is morally
permissible or whether, as in Philippa Foot12 and Judith Jarvis
Thomson’s13trolley problem, one can legally or morally kill one innocent
person to save, say, five equally innocent persons from certain death.14
The examples that I have thus far been using for illustrative purposes
have involved different conceptions and presuppositions about the nature of
the moral universe or what might be called the moral world. In this article I
intend to focus more attention on the presuppositions underlying our
conceptions of what might loosely be called the material world. The
distinction between the world of values and the material world is of course
not subject to clear demarcation and, as will appear as the discussion
proceeds, our preconceptions about the nature of the material world are
often influenced by our conceptions of the nature of the moral world. In this
article I am going to discuss a set of assumptions about the nature of the
world that has tremendous importance for legal and moral reasoning. This
set of assumptions, which as we shall see underlies the work not only of
lawyers and judges but also of moral philosophers like John Rawls, does
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not appear on its face to be about the normative structure of the legal and
moral universes but it probably has had as much impact on legal and moral
argument as any of the legal and moral preconceptions to which I have thus
far briefly alluded. I am referring to the question of whether, in our legal
and moral reasoning, we conceive of the social and material structure of the
world we live in as static or dynamic. When asked, almost everyone, in the
developed world at least, would say that of course the social and material
worlds in which we live are dynamic, but, if one examines in detail the
arguments used in much legal and moral reasoning, it is not at all apparent
that this is, in point of fact, the case.
We are sometimes tempted to dismiss arguments for a static vision of
the world as mere manoeuvring with an ulterior purpose, as for example
when federal regulation of telegraph lines was attacked in 1878 on the
ground that, at the time the United States Constitution was adopted in the
late Eighteenth Century, the telegraph had not been invented or even
conceived of; and thus its regulation by the federal government was not
covered by the interstate commerce clause’s grant to Congress of power to
regulate commerce among the state.15 In many other instances of legal and
moral argument, however, the question of whether we have a dynamic or
static view of the world is a real one and yet either escapes attention
altogether or, for some other reason, is totally ignored. In legal
argumentation, an instance that deserves more attention than it has received
is the curious opinion of Justice Douglas in Standard Oil Company of
California v United States,16 decided in 1949, and often referred to as the
‘Standard Stations Case.’ In that case the question presented was whether
exclusive dealing arrangements between Standard Oil and independent
filling station operators covering gasoline, lubricating oil, and automobile
accessories violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act of 1914 which prohibits
such arrangements where ‘the effect [of such arrangements] … may be to
substantially lessen competition.’17 The principal product covered was
gasoline and the evidence showed that these arrangements covered roughly
$58,000,000 or 6.7 per cent of the total volume of gasoline sold annually in
the relevant seven state area. Since no evidence was introduced as to
whether there had in fact been a lessening of competition in the geographic
area in question, the issue before the Court boiled down to whether, because
$58,000,000 was a substantial sum of money in 1949, it might plausibly be
15
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inferred, as the trial judge had found, that such arrangements might in fact
have the effect of lessening competition.
Writing for himself and the four other Justices who comprised the
majority, Justice Frankfurter concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
support the inference. Justice Jackson, writing for himself and two other
Justices, concluded that this evidence was inconclusive and dissented.
Justice Douglas also dissented but, in the official reports, his opinion is
merely labelled ‘Opinion of Justice Douglas’ and not as a ‘Dissenting
Opinion’ as is the normal practice. Instead of focusing on whether Congress
had a quantitative test in mind when it enacted the ‘may be to substantially
lessen competition’ language, as did Justice Frankfurter, or focusing on the
probative value of the evidence, as did Justice Jackson, Justice Douglas
talked about the value of small businesses in the American social scheme
and the importance of maintaining independently owned local businesses.
For Douglas, it was obvious that the oil companies would respond to the
Court’s decision by either operating filling stations through subsidiaries or
through the greater use of agency relationships which, in both cases, would
spell the end of local, independently owned filling stations selling branded
products of the major oil companies.18
One recalls Justice Holmes declaration in The Path of the Law19 that
judges should ‘recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social
advantage’20 and that ‘a body of law is more rational and more civilized
when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end
which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or
are ready to be stated.’21 Douglas’ opinion in the Standard Stations Case,
comes the closest of any that I have ever seen to fulfilling Holmes’
exhortation. Douglas’ opinion may also illustrate the impracticability of
taking Holmes’ advice seriously. As a judge, Holmes surely did not.22 Be
that as it may, Douglas made it clear that, by ignoring the fact that the
American economy was a dynamic one, the end result of the Court’s
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majority or dissenting opinions even considered the question.
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Ibid 467.
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decision was likely to be a lessening of competition, the very evil the statute
was designed to prevent, and not the enhancement of competition.
One might say that the inability of courts to properly take into
account, and sometimes not even to understand the consequences of the
dynamic nature of society, is a reason not to give courts or even quasijudicial administrative agencies broad authority over the economy. In the
famous Red Lion23 case, for example, that was decided in 1969, the
Supreme Court of the United States upheld a rule of the Federal
Communications Commission that required a radio station that aired a
personal attack on an individual to give that person free air time to respond
to the attack. The stated basis of the decision was that the air waves were a
scarce commodity and that, therefore, a degree of government regulation
would be acceptable, and even perhaps desirable, that would clearly be an
unconstitutional infringement of speech if applied to the print media. We all
know what has happened. The number of possibly available radio and
television channels has expanded literally exponentially24 while the
principal traditional print medium, the daily newspaper – which the
Supreme Court has subsequently held can even refuse a right of reply to
political candidates that they have attacked25 – has become a largely
monopoly business in most parts of the United States. It was only in 2000,
and under judicial compulsion, that the FCC rescinded the regulation.26
The assumption of a static universe is more prominent in moral
philosophy, particularly in discussions of ‘justice’. It is, for example, an
important feature of John Rawls’27 work that requires close attention from
legal scholars because not only has Rawls had a significant influence on
legal theory but also, and perhaps more urgently, because the potential of
Rawls’ work to affect the actual law itself cannot be ignored, as Rawls in
his later work has commented more and more on the need for the legal

23
24

25
26

27

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC (1969) 395 U.S. 367.
Yochai Benkler, ‘Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment’ (1998) 11 Harvard Journal of Law and
Technology 290.
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v Tornillo (1974) 418 U.S. 241.
Because a divided Federal Communications Commission was unable, over a
period of 20 years, to respond to a petition to revoke 47 C.F.R.s 47 1920, the
personal attack regulation at issue in the Red Lion, it was finally ordered, in
Radio-Television News Directors v FCC (D.C. Cir. 2000) 229 F. 2d 269, to
rescind that provision, and the Commission did so, effective 26 October
2000. See (7 November 2000) 65 Fed. Reg. 66643-01.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) (hereinafter A Theory of Justice )
(revised ed, 1999) (hereinafter A Theory of Justice (rev ed)); Political
Liberalism (1993) (hereinafter Political Liberalism); Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement (2001) (hereinafter Justice as Fairness).

46

(2003) 28 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy

regulation of speech and other social practices.28 The late Robert Nozick29
long ago pointed out that a society organised in accordance with Rawls’
principles that permitted any significant degree of free exchange among its
members would sooner or later, and much more likely sooner rather than
later, find that its citizens had traded themselves into a situation in which
increasing disparities of wealth could not easily, if at all, be justified by any
improvement in the lot of the least advantaged. An example showing the
inadequacy of all end-state theories of justice that Nozick found attractive
involves a professional basketball player whom people so much enjoy
seeing play that they are prepared to pay sufficiently large sums of money
for that privilege that he can command an enormous salary.30 Nozick’s
point was that to preserve Rawls’ desired end state, namely a society in
which economic inequalites are only permitted to the extent of their
producing an improvement in the lot of the least advantaged members of
society, would require an extensive degree of state intervention to insure the
continual redistribution of wealth that would be needed to maintain the
desired equilibrium.31
Rawls has never really responded to this criticism, possibly because
he was prepared to accept the confiscatory rates of taxation and the constant
close surveillance of economic activity to prevent tax avoidance that would
be necessary to maintain the equilibrium that he seeks. In such
circumstances the commitment to a relatively free society would be
severely compromised. The required level of governmental intrusion into
the lives of citizens might be sufficiently low to be tolerable in a static
society; it could escalate to intolerable levels in a dynamic society.
The problem, particularly in a dynamic world, of state intrusion into
the life of its citizens is highlighted in Rawls’ later work.32 As everyone is
aware, Rawls is vehement on the need to regulate and limit the amount
anyone can spend on political campaigns.33 The rationale is that people are
entitled not merely to the legal right to free political discussion but to the
equal opportunity actually to exercise that right. Rawls never tells us why
people like Rupert Murdoch or the late Robert Maxwell should be able, in
their all too partisan newspapers, to advocate the election of one candidate
rather than another but the attacked candidate should not be able to raise
enough money to purchase television time or space in other news media to
counteract that endorsement. If Rawls were consistent he would have to
28
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admit that he really is not in favour of a largely unfettered and unregulated
press. But, even leaving aside the Murdochs or the Maxwells or even the
New York Times, if one takes seriously Rawls’ assertion that no one has a
moral entitlement to his greater talents and abilities or to his strength of
character,34 since these are all the result either of genetics or of nurturing,
then it would follow that the state should intervene to insure that the more
articulate and charismatic do not, by the exercise of those morally
undeserved personal characteristics, prevent others, over time, from having
a fair equality of opportunity to influence political debate. Rawls may in
fact believe that a state as intrusive as the one preferred by Plato is a
necessary feature of a society committed to justice as fairness. If so, he
should have said it more directly, and not merely hinted at it as in the
instance I have discussed or in the suggestion that the tax laws and the
antitrust laws should be used to hinder or restrict a corporation’s ability to
advertise socially useless products.35 As determined by whom, we might
ask.
The dynamic nature of the real world poses additional and even more
basic problems for Rawls. The core of Rawls’ theory is based on the
assumption that universal agreement on a comprehensive vision of the
nature of the good is impossible.36 Instead one should try to determine what
the structure of an ideal society, or, at least, one with the level of social and
economic development achieved in the western world – that is, what Rawls
calls a modern democratic society37 – would look like if chosen by
representative people on the basis of their perception of their self-interest
under certain ideal conditions.38 These ideal conditions, described as the
original position, include a veil of ignorance, that is to say a complete lack
of knowledge on the part of the participants about their health, physical and
mental abilities, and any other contingent feature of actual existence, that
might influence their choice of the basic principles that are to govern their
society. As is well known, Rawls concludes that rational, self-interested
people deliberating under such conditions would insist on the lexical
priority of personal liberty, including freedom of expression, although as we
have seen Rawls’ view as to what those liberties are does not exactly track
the liberties enshrined in constitutions such as that of the United States.
They would also insist on a society characterised by fair equality of
opportunity, premised, as we have noted, on the assumption that no one has
34
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any moral claim to the advantages he obtains from his intellectual or moral
or, presumably, his physical abilities. Having achieved these two desiderata,
they would then insist that the distribution of social goods like wealth
should be based on the system that would be chosen by these representative
people through the application of the maximin principle which, although it
operates most clearly at the level of the distribution of social goods, also
informs both the discussion about the nature of the political liberty to be
guaranteed in the ideal state and the discussion of what the fair equality of
opportunity means.39
The maximin principle does not, however, establish the lexical
priority of either personal liberty or the special weight to be granted to the
principle of fair equality of opportunity. That requires, as Rawls came to
recognise, an assumption that the participants in the discussions taking
place in the original position, who know nothing about what the lottery of
life will deliver to them in the way of health and physical and mental
abilities, nonetheless know that they are creating a framework for a
relatively advanced society.40 Whether this is a significant piercing of
Rawls’ veil of ignorance or not, this extra bit of knowledge presumably
would lead all rational, self-interested people to place basic liberty lexically
prior to any other basic social goods and, among social goods, to place fair
equality of opportunity above all the remaining social goods. Without it
rational, self-interested people might well choose material welfare over
liberty or equality of opportunity.
The inadequacy of the maximin principle to support Rawls’ thesis is
most evident, however, in the core area of its application, namely in the
formulation of the difference principle which is to govern the distribution of
most basic social goods. Rawls’ argument is of course well known. Any
deviations from the equal distribution of these social goods must be
justified by a showing that permitting an unequal distribution will enhance
the lot of the least advantaged members of society.41 This is presumably
what rational, self-interested people, who know nothing about what their
eventual position in society will be, would choose if they found themselves
in Rawls’ original position. But, as the difference principle itself implicitly
acknowledges, social life is not static; it changes over time and those who
choose the difference principle are obviously aware of this general fact of
social life. Given this presumed knowledge about social development, what
strategy would a rational, self-interested person who is guided by the
maximin principle in his deliberations choose to pursue?
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Rawls himself gives a hint at the choices such a person would face in
his latest book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, where he actually
discusses the question of why a rational, self-interested person would
choose the difference principle as the basic distributive principle of social
goods rather than some version of a capitalist society with a stateguaranteed minimum level of welfare for all its citizens.42 His argument is
not very convincing. From the position of a rational, self-interested person
the choice would seem to be clear. Such a person would realise that there is
an absolute limit to the downside risk, even if he is one of the few who fall
into the category of the least advantaged. So the questions is, given the
limited downside outcome – which by the way need not be assumed to be
any lower, and indeed as Rawls himself recognises might well be higher,43
than the share of the least advantaged members in the same society were it
governed by the difference principle – why would not such a individual,
knowing with a certainty that he is unlikely to be among the least
advantaged members of society, choose, as the preferable social scheme,
one that would offer him a potentially greater material pay off than one
organised under the difference principle? If one now takes into account that
such a rational, self-interested person would also know that there is a 50 per
cent probability that he would have an above-average endowment of
physical and mental abilities and that therefore, if he were above average,
he would be highly likely to benefit from a system which, because it is of
necessity dynamic, would allow him greater opportunity to reap over time
the advantages that those above-average endowments would afford him, the
rational choice becomes obvious to any self-interested person, even if he
uses the maximin principle to decide among possible alternatives.
Rawls gives two kinds of reasons why a rational, self-interested
person would not choose a society that permitted the economic freedom and
the resultant greater economic inequality that would be permitted in a
guaranteed-minimum, capitalist welfare state organised on democratic
principles. The first kind of reason relates to the administrative feasibility of
the two alternatives under consideration. Rawls suggests that a guaranteedminimum-welfare capitalist regime, which he believes should be
characterised as an instance of a society organised on the principle of
restricted utility, would suffer from indeterminacy.44 Why it would be more
difficult in practice to establish the guaranteed minimum than to establish
who are the least advantaged, or to determine ex ante what proposed
changes in distribution would or would not enhance the position of the least
advantaged, is not immediately obvious. Moreover, Rawls, as we have
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already noted,45 also argued that society should regulate and limit
expenditures on ‘socially wasteful’ advertising.46 Rawls seems to have felt
that a democratic society could easily determine what is advertising that
appeals to consumers on the basis of ‘superficial and unimportant
properties’ or what should be forbidden or discouraged because it tries ‘to
influence consumers preferences by presenting the firm as trustworthy
through the use of slogans, eye-catching photographs, and so on.’47 The
supposed greater ease of making these determinations escapes me. Indeed
the apparent drabness of the type of society that Rawls sets forth as the
optimal one is perhaps a good reason to believe that it is not a desirable one.
Be that as it may, the success of guaranteed-minimum-welfare capitalist
societies in Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand is
certainly very strong evidence that establishing such minimums is not such
an insurmountable problem.
The second and, to him, more important objection put forth by Rawls
against a guaranteed-minimum-welfare capitalist society is that the greater
the inequality of condition permitted by society the greater the resentment
and the loss of self-esteem and alienation of those who enjoy lesser
advantages.48 Rawls believes that a society with greater disparities of
income and wealth than he believes optimal would be a less-stable
society,49 which clearly must be one of the reasons he claims that rational,
self-interested and risk-averse people would choose his system of political
justice, even if it were considerably more likely that they would be
materially better off under a guaranteed-minimum-welfare capitalist
regime,50 in which basic material welfare was guaranteed and the chances of
their being among the least advantaged were quite low. To prefer Rawls’
proposal, because it promises greater social stability, however, involves the
assumption that, in a dynamic world, a society which permits a greater
degree of inequality than would be permitted in a society organised as
Rawls wishes would necessarily generate greater alienation and resentment,
even if, as Rawls himself at times seems to recognise, the maintenance of
his preferred social structure would require a very intrusive and at times
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coercive state.51 The history of civilisation comes as close as anything in the
real world can to demonstrating the falsity of that assumption.52
Despite his protestations that universal agreement about the content
of the good is unobtainable, Rawls position can only be maintained if one
accepts that equality is an ultimate social good that all would accept.53
Moreover, it is not equality in the abstract but a specific vision of equality
that must be universally accepted. One might secure as universal an
agreement as is practically possible for the proposition that equality before
the law is an ultimate good. General agreement that no one is entitled to the
advantages obtainable by superior abilities or talents has never yet been
attained, despite massive re-education schemes, and the history of the
human race suggests that it never will be. Rawls himself admits that the
family is the greatest single impediment to the achievement of equality in
the real world.54 The fact that he shrinks from proposing a solution to what
some might consider an ‘unfortunate’ social contingency speaks volumes. It
is no answer that Rawls is only talking about what noumenal persons, in
some Kantian sense, would choose as the ideal structure of society. After
all, Rawls asks us to accept the validity of his vision of the structure of
justice by taking into consideration, in our search for a reflective
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Rawls asserts that his purpose is that of ‘ensuing the widespread ownership
of productive capital (that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning
of each period, all this against a background of fair assets and human
equality and opportunity.’ Ibid 139. I am of course not arguing against either
the widespread ownership of what Rawls calls productive capital or equality
of opportunity but the means to be used to achieve these desiderata. See also
above n 27 to 35 and accompanying text.
Whatever criticisms have been made of the United States, which clearly
does not approach Rawls’ ideal as closely as does a guaranteed-minimumwelfare capitalist regime, no one has suggested that it is an unstable society.
Rawls comes close to actually taking this position when he states: ‘The least
advantaged are not, if all goes well, the unfortunate and unlucky – objects of
our charity and compassion, much less our pity – but those to whom
reciprocity is owned as a matter of political justice among those who are
free and equal citizens along with everyone else. Although they control
fewer resources, they are doing their full share on terms recognized by all as
mutually advantageous and consistent with everyone’s self-respect.’ Ibid
139.
Theory of Justice at 500. See also id at 74, 300. In Justice as Fairness
162-68, Rawls discusses principles of justice that should be applied to
families but he confesses that it is not clear that ‘fulfillment of these
principles suffices to remedy the system’s faults.’ Ibid 168. Rawls’
suggestions only relate to establishing a more just and democratic family
structure, not the ‘undeserved’ benefits of nurturing which his suggestions
might only serve to accentuate.
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equilibrium,55 our knowledge of real people living in the real world.
However we structure our thought experiments, it is we as real people, that
is as members of a species that is the product of a very long period of
animal evolution, who must decide what is to be the ideal structure of
justice in the societies in which we live.

55

Theory of Justice at 48-51.

